Summer 2018

"In an age when terrorists move information at the speed of an email, money at the speed of a wire transfer, and people at the speed of a commercial jetliner, the Defense Department is bogged down in the micromanagement and bureaucratic processes of the industrial age—not the information age. Some of our difficulties are self-imposed, to be sure. Some are the result of law and regulation. Together they have created a culture that too often stifles innovation.... The point is this: we are fighting the first wars of the 21st century with a Defense Department that was fashioned to meet the challenges of the mid- 20th century. We have an industrial age organization, yet we are living in an information age world, where new threats emerge suddenly, often without warning, to surprise us. We cannot afford not to change and rapidly, if we hope to live in that world."

—Rumsfeld, D, U.S. Secretary of Defense February 2003, Prepared Statements to House
Armed Services Committee, FY 2004 Defense Budget Hearings

I love this quote because it demonstrates two things. 

Abstract:

Current critical infrastructures can be considered Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), which seamlessly integrate human, physical, and computational elements. Data for this case study is collected from 16 R&D projects from three Finnish universities. Results indicate that future CPS competences are multidisciplinary, and include many industrial sectors, academic disciplines, and theories.

Abstract: 

Immature classification methods for cyber events prevent technical staff, organisational leaders, and policy makers from engaging in meaningful and nuanced conversations about the threats they face. This paper provides a new taxonomy of cyber effects that is used to analyse over 2,431 publicised cyber events from 2014 to 2016.

Abstract: 

Cyber operations lack models, methodologies, and mechanisms to describe relevant data and knowledge. This problem is directly reflected when cyber operations are conducted, and their effects assessed, and it can produce dissonance and disturbance in corresponding decision-making processes and communication between different military actors.

Abstract:

Cyberattacks have grown in importance to become a matter of national security. A growing number of states and organisations have been developing defensive and offensive capabilities for cyber warfare. Security criteria are important tools for defensive capabilities of critical communications and information systems. This paper enhances an earlier model for efficient development of security-audit criteria.

Abstract:

Changes in European legislation are forcing web-application providers to take greater responsibility with regard to keeping their users’ personal information private. One architectural solution that allows users of the system to stay in full control of their own personal information is a decentralised data model. This paper proposes a decentralised architectural model called DEPRIM, which makes use of Digital Rights Management (DRM) to enforce access control over personal information. The DEPRIM architecture allows users to stay in control of their data and controls the access of application providers.

Abstract:

Sophisticated attacks usually involve decision logic that observes the victim’s responses before deciding the next action. Such logic presents an opportunity for the defence, as it provides a controllable feedback channel. Manoeuvres that manipulate responses can confuse the adversary’s decision process, causing them to undertake ineffective actions.

Abstract:

Cyber war games have been shown to be useful for a broad range of purposes. The authors describe and compare  methods for  designing  realistic war games  in  the  domain of Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), review general methods for conducting war games, and illustrate best practices to assist researchers and practitioners in planning their own war games. 

Abstract:

The concepts of cyber-arms races and cyber-weapon proliferation have been on the horizon for almost two decades, with Stuxnet often cited as a proof-of-concept. However, the factors driving an actor, for example, a state, to engage in development and proliferation are underexplored. Taking a theoretical approach, this paper seeks to determine the most important factors by comparing and contrasting traditional proliferation literature spanning nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as small arms and light weapons.