The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made public opinion warfare a key plank in its grand three warfares strategy of achieving a soft power victory against adversaries before it needs to commit hard combat power. Information warriors from nations opposed to the expansion of the CCP’s tyrannical political control must aggressively counter attack this public opinion warfare. China’s state-controlled media is a major asset in waging public opinion warfare in the international media environment. An essential question is what public image or narratives about itself is the CCP trying to sell foreign audiences? This study attempts to understand how China frames itself to foreign audiences. It was discovered that the international broadcasters emphasized economic goals while systematically avoiding both problems and their causes facing China and its population. Counter frames and counter narrative strategies are offered for information warriors.
This article investigates over 130,000 Telegram messages, 15,000 Telegram forwards, and 750 news articles from Russian-affiliated media to assess the information supply chain between Russian media and Telegram channels covering the war in Ukraine. Using machine-learning techniques, this research provides a framework for conducting argument and network analysis for disambiguating narratives, channels, and users, and mapping dissemination pathways of influence operations. The findings indicate that a central feature of Russian war reporting is actually the prevalence of neutral, non-argumentative language. Moreover, dissemination patterns between media sites and Telegram channels reveal a well-cited information laundering network with a distinct supply chain of covert, semi-covert, and overt channel types active at seed, copy, and amplification levels of operation.
This paper introduces a model to combat fake news and propaganda spread on social media, derived from a systematic literature review of 28 articles. It outlines the model based on seven key themes: scepticism, AI detection, fact checking, media literacy, ethical technology use, digital manipulation, and community verification. This comprehensive model aims to bolster individuals’ and communities’ abilities to critically assess information, emphasising its application in research, policy, and education. By advocating a multi-layered strategy, the model seeks to foster a discerning global community equipped to navigate the complexities of discerning fake news and propaganda.
The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China signed a formal agreement to cooperate on the creation and dissemination of a jointly constructed propaganda narrative for a global audience. There is some anecdotal evidence and some very basic research to suggest this cooperation might be happening. However, this study aims to use scientific research methods from the Agenda Setting Theory to prove or disprove this alleged propaganda cooperation. The author assessed a N = 600 sample of articles from English language versions of Russian Sputnik and the Chinese Global Times and People’s Daily. The evidence indicates a low level of propaganda cooperation. Russia and China appear to be pursuing their own strategic goals with propaganda. This finding has important implications for information warriors’ and strategic communication professionals’ task and counterpropaganda.
In the era of labels, distinguishing between constructs is becoming increasingly difficult. Covert action and hybrid warfare are two constructs suffering from this predicament. The question is whether covert action is hybrid warfare, vis-a-versa, or whether one construct eclipsed the other. In an era where covert action has become problematic from an international relations perspective, is this predicament being resolved by labelling covert action as hybrid warfare? This article explores the semantics and nuances of these two constructs to clarify their relative utility. The paper argues that covert action is subordinate to hybrid warfare. Covert action forms part of a synchronized line of effort within a broader hybrid warfare campaign, when planned effectively against a target and target audience(s).
Foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) on social media is a fast- evolving threat to democracies. However, there is a growing need to systematically conceptualise the phenomenon. General Morphological Analysis seeks to explore the totalities of a complex problem, but is restricted by simplification. Using and modifying the method expands the morphological space. This expansion and relying on statistical calculation expose internal interdependencies of the phenomenon. Operation design is largely dependent on five parameters: ‘spread strategy’, ‘information channelling’, ‘market targeting’, ‘presented source’, and ‘operational openness’. These parameters are more likely to affect other parameters and thereby define significant aspects of a FIMI operation.
This article examines a known Russian propaganda website, News Room for American and European Based Citizens (NAEBC), run by the Internet Research Agency (IRA), that delivers propaganda through junk news. Using agenda-building theory, it seeks to determine if it can uncover the propagandists’ goals and motivations in order to examine its implications for information warfare. It finds that the IRA is using its extensive resources to agitate right-wing political extremists into violence. This calls into question whether the provocation of a civil war within the United States is a strategic information warfare goal of the Russian government.
This study examines the testable question of whether junk news in the service of propaganda can form coherent narrative structure that can be analyzed and countered. The analysis was conducted using a known junk news site, USA Really, which is sponsored by the Russian Government, and which targets American citizens. Leveraging the Narrative Paradigm theory and ethnographic content analysis are the methods of research; an analysis of (N =150) were qualitatively analyzed. An unexpected finding that USA Really was constructing a conspiracy narrative targeting far right-wing extremists emerged. The study also identified a new type of narrative, not accounted for in narrative paradigm theory, that was meant to cause dissension rather than to serve as a guide for proper conduct.
This paper scientifically examines the claims of an extensive Russian propaganda targeting the population of the United States made by an organization called Prop or Not. Using the Agenda Setting Theory, it examined the intermedia agenda setting effects between the Russian State Media outlet Sputnik and four weblogs listed by Prop or Not. The results of the study found a strong positive correlation between Sputnik and Zero Hedge, New Cold War, Global Research, and the Daily Sheeple in terms of very favorable coverage of Russia and its allies. A positive but weaker correlation was found between these media sources and their coverage of the United States and its allies.
This article uses agenda building theory to examine how the People’s Republic of China is using propaganda in the form of news to build an agenda within global news media as part of their Three Warfares Strategy. This qualitative content analysis of the English language version of the Global Times revealed that the PRC is building an offensive news agenda to directly challenge the credibility and legitimacy of its rivals. It is obsessively preoccupied by receiving blame for COVID-19-related mistakes and threats of economic decoupling.
The Taliban are engaged in strategic information warfare on multiple fronts. This study examines how the Taliban use frames to transmit ideology for Information Operations. Frames are used tactically in information warfare because they are designed to generate responses via emotionally laden communication defined as propaganda. This study is unique because it analyses data derived from digital domains and from physical sources in Kabul. A Taliban Communication Typology has been culled from the 66 individual Taliban frames identified in this research. Analysis, via ontological coding, indicates that the Taliban communicate along five core messages that are framed to outline problems and solutions.
Internet social media sites enable the rapid and widespread production and dissemi- nation of propaganda. Although propaganda has a long history in warfare, the spreading of propaganda via social media is markedly different from past distribution methods. The authors investigated the relationships between state-affiliated actors who use social media to produce and distribute propaganda and their national cultural values.
Framed by the historic 2013-2015 conflict in Ukraine—widely described by Western media as a ‘Cold-War’-style clash between the Russian Federation and the United States/NATO alliance—this qualitative case study examines how social media was used as a platform for propaganda warfare waged by clandestine bloggers and special operations commandos (known as trolls) deployed worldwide by state and non-state actors, and digitally linked and informed by data-mining, to manipulate public perceptions of the events by controlling an element of rhetoric known as narratives.
The concept of globalism can be traced back thousands of years, most remarkably, to ancient Babylonia. Information warfare has enabled this enchanting concept to survive into the present Age.
This paper investigates and critiques the propaganda emanating from the main players in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ (USA, UK, and Australia) in the three months before the invasion of Iraq. It outlines the US-led information campaign and analyses its successes and failures.
The paper investigates the use of the Internet. by terrorist and dissident groups for publicity, propaganda, and fund raising. It examines the new anti-terrorism legislation passed in the last few years (especially the UK Terrorism Act), and its impact in the Internet presence of proscribed groups.
Perception management is integral to the art of war. Skillful use of information warfare, psychological operations and propaganda is problematic, however. Based on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception and the practical examples presented in this article – the Finnish Winter War and the war on terrorism – it can be held that perception and its interpretation can never be certain. If perceptions are manufactured, they can become counter-productive. The way in which perceptions arise is characterized by dynamism. According to Mzerleau-Ponty, there is always a middle ground between us and the enemy, a field that distorts and limits our view of the enemy. Therefore, in this article we propose that we can direct propaganda only towards ourselves.
For most people, the word ‘propaganda’ conjures up all sorts of negative connotations – from brainwashing to dirty tricks to outright lying. Theoretically, this is misguided. However, although it is now probably too late in the day to attempt to strip away the negative connotations in the popular mind of this ‘P word’, nonetheless there is a need to first understand what propaganda actually is conceptually, and to understand how the word itself has acquired such a pejorative meaning, before examining what its contemporary alternative word descriptions (euphemisms) actually involve and mean.
This article is a comparative study of the practice of state-sponsored influence activities in its various forms (namely propaganda, public diplomacy, psychological operations, public affairs, cyber warfare, electronic warfare and so on) in selected Asian countries (China, Taiwan, Thailand and Japan). It highlights the state of Asian development, differences in concepts, organization and application as compared to the Western models that today dominate discussions on information operations and influence activity. By doing so, it provides alternative ways of approaching Information Operations (IO) that might contribute to the generation of challenges and solutions facing today’s policy makers. Finally, it will serve to broaden the body of knowledge in influence activities to include both Eastern and Western viewpoints.
I once calculated, on the back of a napkin thoroughly drenched in Outback steak juice, that it takes a whole lot of paper to wage a war. I mean, a terrific amount of paper: something like 3,412.7 pieces of papers for every combatant and support soldier in the chain of command. If the war or Operation Other Than War (OOW) or a peace keeping mission carries on for more than six weeks, the paperwork jungle doubles and as the war continues into months, the paperwork increases, but at a lesser rate of bureaucratic indulgence
All of this war-fighting paper means there has to be a whole lot of paper pushers to push the paper needed to fight the war. To support the paper pushers, you have to have people to buy the paper and the pens at the right price; a price that the government would be proud to pay as long as they’re fighting a war. And of course, you have to have bean counters to count how much paper the paper pushers are pushing which is what really makes the whole war business worth doing in the first place. You see, war is a lot about paper.
The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.
The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.