The leading question of this paper is “How can one conceptualise influence warfare in order to simulate it?” The authors discuss the foundational aspects of theory and model of influence warfare by building a conceptual framework. The framework forms a prism with three axes along the DIME/PMESII/ASCOP dimensions. The DIME concept groups the many instru-ments of power a nation-state can muster into four elements: Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics. PMESII describes the operational environment in six domains: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure. ASCOPE is used in COunterINsurgency (COIN) environments to analyse the cultural and human environment (the ‘human terrain’) and encompasses Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organization, People, and Events.
The following three articles examine three causal mechanisms prompting U.S. adversarial nation states to shift preference from conventional warfare (CW) to Non-Conventional Warfare (NCW): (1) the expansion of the information environment; (2) the globalisation, diffusion, and weaponisation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs); and (3) their acknowledgment that NCW provides a broader menu of indirect approaches not previously afforded through traditional CW. It cautions U.S. decision makers to recognise this shift and to counter it by establishing an interagency Information Warfare Directorate in the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC IWD should draft practical policies that result in the integration of the various aspects of domestic and foreign departments and agencies to cross-coordinate NCW activities. This will require remediating national policy and authority gaps as well as addressing any shortcomings in the budget allocation process.
This article expands upon the previous article by examining the efficacy of Conventional Warfare (CW in a Non-Conventional Warfare (NCW environment. In particular, it attempts to characterise the relationship between globalisation and diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT, in relation to its antifragility in NCW settings. More broadly, it argues that in an information-rich environment, characterised by advanced ICTs, adversaries now have the means to circumvent CW superiority and to influence policy asymmetrically. This article concludes that ICTs may align more appropriately with an NCW paradigm rather than the ostensible CW paradigm embraced by the West.
This concluding article briefly returns to the key themes identified in the first two articles in relation to the three causal mechanisms that prompted U.S. adversarial nation states to shift preference from Conventional Warfare (CW) to Non-Conventional Warfare (NCW). The article argues that by attaching an overt degree of salience to the integration of ICT in CW, analysts have overlooked its potential in NCW.
While Cyber CounterIntelligence (CCI) has been a distinctive specialisation field for state security structures internationally for well over a decade, recently there has been growing recognition of CCI’s significance to non-state actors. CCI is central to proactively mitigating cyber risk and exploiting opportunities. With the growing recognition of CCI’s significance comes an appreciation of its complexity. CCI is all about outthinking and outwitting adversaries. This article advances a conceptual matrix that can serve both as a high-level ‘pocket guide’ for outsmarting adversaries and as an aid to academic research.
This paper introduces the concept of cyber sanctions, which can be defined as the actual or threatened restriction of digital transactions to affect a behavioural change by the target through the introduction of psychological pressure against its political leaders and populace. While the concept of ‘internet sovereignty’ deals with the country’s choice to control foreign data from coming in or ‘sovereign’ data from going out (self-imposed digital isolation), cyber sanctions deal with senders (powerul states or entities imposing the sanctions) restricting certain ‘flagged’ data from traveling to or from the target (forced digital isolation).
The information influence framework was developed to identify and to assess hostile, strategy-driven, state-sponsored information activities. This research proposes and tests an analytical approach and assessment tool called information influence and interference to measure changes in the level of strategy-driven, state-sponsored information activities by the timeliness, specificity, and targeted nature of communications as well as the dissemination tactics of publicly available information.
Applying big data and sentiment analysis to TASS reporting and 15 years of Russian Foreign Ministry documents, this paper tests the importance Moscow places on information control. By comparing the Russian government’s responses to four categories of foreign policy tools— diplomatic, information, military, and economic (the DIME construct)—this research finds that Russia reacts far more negatively to information tools than to military, diplomatic, or economic tools.
This article series examines the evolution of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Information Op- eration (IO) activities during an eight-year timespan from 2006 to 2014. The case study shows a change in the Israeli Defense Forces’ activities in the information domain. It also shows that, while battles can be easily won in the physical domain of the battlefield through superior firepower, the battles in the information domain are much more complicated and require much more diverse and complex means to achieve victories. The first part of the article series describes the framework and methods of the study and two military operations conducted in 2006 and 2008-2009.
This article series examines the evolution of the Israel Defense Forces’ Information Operation activities during an eight-year timespan, from 2006 to 2014. To this end, the case study shows a change in the Israel Defense Forces’ activities in the information domain. It also shows that, while battles can be easily won in the physical domain of the battlefield through superior firepower, the battles in the information domain are much more complicated and require much more diverse and complex means to achieve victories. The first part of the article series described the framework and methods of the study and two military operations conducted in 2006 and 2008-2009.
This article series examines the evolution of the Israel Defense Forces’ Information Operation activities during an eight-year timespan from 2006 to 2014. To this end, the case study shows a change in the Israel Defense Forces’ activities in the information domain. It also shows that, while battles can be easily won in the physical domain of the battlefield through superior firepower, the battles in the information domain are much more complicated and require much more diverse and complex means to achieve victories.
Immature classification methods for cyber events prevent technical staff, organisational leaders, and policy makers from engaging in meaningful and nuanced conversations about the threats they face. This paper provides a new taxonomy of cyber effects that is used to analyse over 2,431 publicised cyber events from 2014 to 2016.
Modern military operations continue to be extraordinarily susceptible to the effects of cyber-based Information Operations (IO). Within social media lies the ability to gain a clearer perspective of the 21st-century battlefields, enabling rapid and informed decision making and decisive action by commanders and their staffs. This paper discusses emerging trends, threats, and concepts that are being employed by numerous actors around the globe to gain positional advantage both internal and external to the cyberspace domain.
Military Training and Education is evolving because of the growing influence of Information Operations (IO) and Information Warfare (IW). This influence has grown from the tremendous changes in both technology and social issues. Traditional military training has dealt with key elements such as operational concepts of war, doctrine and law; leadership; combat skills; weapons skills; and operating effectively under stress.
This paper questions the efficacy of the notion of information warfare (IW) due to implicit militaristic nuances which critically impact on its application as a policy instrument for optimum effects in dynamic sociopolitical spheres.
This paper has three objectives. Firstly, critically examine the triatic relationship between ‘Command’, ‘Influence’ and ‘Information’ in three dimensional (3D) tactics. Secondly, explain how this relationship enables the 3D tactics of rhizome manoeuvre.
The concept of globalism can be traced back thousands of years, most remarkably, to ancient Babylonia. Information warfare has enabled this enchanting concept to survive into the present Age.
Asymmetric warfare is frequently described as a conflict between two parties where the ‘weaker’ party aims to offset its comparatively fewer resources by making use of particular tactical advantages. This paper develops a concept model that captures the leverage available to the ‘weaker’ party over the ‘stronger’ party simply because the former is attacking rather than defending.
The emergence of 3D-printed guns over 2013-15 is part of a more fundamental shift in the dynamics of war caused by two different forms of convergence. One is technology convergence, and the second is the bundling-up of various tactical and operational concepts, developed over the last two decades. These have converged into a broad-based concept called five-dimensional operations or battlespace.
The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.
The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.